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Lecture  One
TECHNICAL CHANGE AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT1-1
We are,  in  the closing years  of  the twentieth century, completing  one  of
the  most remarkable transitions  in the history of  agriculture.  Prior  to  this
century, almost all  increase in food production was  obtained by  bringing new
land into production.  There were  only a few exceptions to  this generalization--
in limited areas of East Asia, in the Middle East,  and  in Western Europe.  By
the  end of  this  century  almost  all of  the increase in world food production must
come from higher yields--from increased output per hectare.  In most of  the
world the  transition from a resource-based  to a science-based system of  agri-
culture  is  occurring within a single century.  In a few countries  this  tran-
sition began in the nineteenth century.  In most  of  the presently developed
countries  it did not begin until the  first half  of  this century.  Most of  the
countries of  the developing world have  been caught up in  the  transition only
since mid-century.
MODELS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE  IN AGRICULTURE
The traditional literature on agricultural development can  be  classified
under  five general headings.  These are  (1) the resource exploitation,  (2)  the
conservation, (3) the location, (4) the diffusion, and (5) the high-payoff  input
models.
The Resource Exploitation Model
Throughout most  of history, expansion of  the  area cultivated or  grazed has
represented the dominant source of  increase in agricultural production.  The
most dramatic example in Western history was the  opening up of  the new
continents--North and South America and Australia--to European settlement during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  With the advent  of  cheap transport
during the  latter half  of  the  nineteenth  century, the  countries of  the new1-2
continents  became increasingly  important sources  of  food and agricultural  raw
materials for  the metropolitan countries of Western Europe.
Similar processes  had  occurred earlier, though at  a less  dramatic pace,  in
the peasant  and village economies  of Europe, Asia, and Africa.  The agrarian
colonization of  the  Indus and Ganges river vallies occurred in the  third millen-
nium B.C.  The first millennium A.D.  saw the  agricultural colonization of Europe
north of  the Alps,  the Chinese settlement of  the lands  south of  the Yangtze, and
the Bantu occupation of Africa south of  the  tropical forest belts.  Intensifica-
tion of  land use  in existing villages was  followed by  pioneer settlement, the
establishment of  new villages, and  the opening up of  forest or jungle  land to
cultivation.  In Western Europe there was a series  of  successive changes  from
neolithic forest  fallow  to systems  of  shifting cultivation of  bush and grassland
followed first  by  short fallow systems,  and  later  by annual cropping.
Where soil conditions were favorable, as  in  the great  river basins  and
plains,  the new villages  gradually intensified  their system of  cultivation.
Where soil resources were poor,  as  in many of  the hill and upland regions, new
areas were opened up to  shifting cultivation or  nomadic grazing.  Under  con-
ditions  of  rapid population growth, the  limits to  the  resource exploitation
model were often quickly realized.  Crop yields were typically low--measured in
terms of  output  per unit  of  seed rather than per unit  of  crop area.  Output per
hectare and per man-hour tended to  decline--except  in the delta areas of Egypt
and South Asia and in the wet  rice areas  of East Asia.  In many areas  the  result
was  increasing  immersionization of  the peasantry.
Agriculture carried on within the  framework of  the  resource exploitation
model was, in most parts of  the world, capable of  supporting only very limited
urban concentrations - trading centers  and seats  of government.  Most food was
consumed in the village in which it  was produced.  Much of  the surplus  that  did1-3
become  available was  extracted from the village by  the land  lords  in  the  form
of  rents,  and  by  the church in the  form of  tithes.  The limited surplus  that
could be accumulated exerted a decisive impact on  political organizations.  The
military campaigns  that  Charlemaign waged against the Germans  to extend his
Frankish kingdom could not  be waged until early summer.  The great heavy horses
that  carried his  armed knights  had to be  out on grass,  after a  winter on poor
feed, long enough to get  in condition.
There  are  relatively  few  remaining  areas  of  the  world  where  development
along  the  lines  of  the  resource  exploitation  model  will  represent  an  efficient
source of growth during the  last  two decades  of  the  twentieth century.  The
1960s  saw  the  "closing of  the frontier"  in most areas of  Southeast Asia.  In
Latin America and Africa the  opening up of  new lands awaits development  of  tech-
nologies for the  control of pests  and diseases  (such as  the  tsetse fly  in
Africa) or  for the  release and maintenance of  productivity of problem soils.
The decline in food production  that has  been experienced in many African
countries over  the  last  several decades is  an insistent  reminder that  agri-
cultural growth along the  lines described by  the  resource exploitation model is
no longer a reliable  source of  growth in food production.
The Conservation Model
The conservation model of  agricultural development evolved from the  advances
in crop and  livestock husbandry associated with the English agricultural
revolution and  the notions of  soil exhaustion suggested by  the early German
chemists and  soil scientists.  It was reinforced by the application to  land of
the concept, developed in the English classical school of  economics,  of  dimin-
ishing returns  to labor and capital.
Until well into  the  twentieth century the conservation model of  agri-
cultural development was the  only approach  to intensification of  agricultural1-4
production available  to most  of  the world's  farmers.  Its  application is  effec-
tively illustrated by  the development  of  the wet-rice  culture  systems  that
emerged in East and Southeast Asia and by  the  labor- and  land-intensive systems
of  integrated crop-livestock husbandry which increasingly  characterized European
agriculture during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
During the English agricultural revolution more intensive  crop-rotation
systems  replaced the open-three-field system in which arable land was  allocated
between permanent cropland and permanent pasture.  This  involved the introduc-
tion and more intensive use of  new  forage and green manure crops  and an increase
in the availability and use of  animal manures.  This  "new husbandry" permitted
the intensification of  crop-livestock production through  the recycling of  plant
nutrients,  in the form of animal manures,  to maintain soil fertility.  The
inputs used in this  conservation system of  farming--the plant  nutrients, animal
power, land  improvements, physical  capital, and agricultural labor force--were
largely produced or supplied by  the agricultural sector itself.
Agricultural development, within the framework of  the conservation model,
clearly was  capable in many parts  of  the world of  sustaining rates  of  growth in
agricultural production in the range of  1.0  percent per year over relatively
long periods  of  time.  The most serious recent  effort  to develop  agriculture
within this framework was made  by  the People's Republic of  China in the  late
1950s and early  1960s.  It  became readily apparent, however, that  the  feasible
growth rates,  even with a rigorous  recycling effort, were not  compatible with
modern rates  of growth in the demand for agricultural output--which typically
fall in the 3-5  percent range in the  less developed countries  (LDCs).  The con-
servation model remains an important  source of  productivity growth in most poor
countries and an inspiration to agrarian fundamentalists and  the organic farming
movement in the  developed countries.1-5
The Location Model
Initially, the  location model was formulated in Germany by J. H. von Thunen
to  explain geographic variations  in  the intensity of  farming systems  and  the
productivity  of  labor in an industrializing society.  In the United States it
was  extended to explain the  more effective performance  of  the input and product
markets  in  regions  of  rapid urban-industrial development than  in regions  of
slower urban-industrial development.  In  the 1950s,  interest in  the location
model reflected concern with  the  failure of  agricultural resource development
and price  policies, adopted  in  the 1930s,  to remove  the persistent  regional
disparities  in agricultural  productivity and  rural  incomes  in the United States.
The rationale  for this  model was  developed in  terms  of more effective  input
and product  markets  in areas  of  rapid urban-industrial  development.  Industrial
development stimulated agricultural development  by  expanding the demand for  farm
products,  supplying the  industrial inputs needed to  improve agricultural  produc-
tivity,  and drawing away  surplus  labor  from agriculture.  The empirical  tests of
the location model have  confirmed repeatedly that a strong nonfarm labor market
is  a prerequisite for  labor productivity in agriculture and improved incomes  for
rural people.
The policy implications  of  the  location model appear to be  most relevant
for less  developed regions  of  highly industrialized countries  or  lagging regions
of  the more rapidly growing LDCs.  Agricultural development policies  based on
this model appear to  be  particularly  inappropriate in those countries where the
"pathological" growth of urban centers  is  a result  of population pressures in
rural areas running ahead of  employment growth in urban areas.
The Diffusion Model
The diffusion of  better husbandry practices was  a major source of  produc-
tivity growth even in premodern societies.  The diffusion of crops  and  animals1-6
from the new world to  the old--potatoes, maize,  cassava, rubber--and from the
old world to  the  new--sugar, wheat, and domestic  livestock--was an important by-
product  of  the voyages of  discovery and  trade from the fifteenth to  the nine-
teenth  centuries.
Diffusion of  crops  and animals had historically proceeded as  a by-product  of
trade, discovery  and migration.  The diffusion of  maize to  the Old World is  an
example.  Within a decade after Columbus had first displayed Indian Corn (maize)
at  the Spanish court it  was  being grown in  the Po Valley in Northern Italy.  In
that relatively short  time it  had diffused from Spain and  across North Africa to
Turkey  and was brought  to  the Po Valley by Venetian traders.
By the  latter part of  the nineteenth  century  all major agricultural nations
were actively engaged in organized  crop exploration and introduction.  The
famous  trip  of  Captain Bligh  to  the South Pacific, described in  the book and  the
film, Mutiny on  the Bounty, was  undertaken as  a crop exploration mission.  His
assignment was  to  bring back breadfruit  seedlings and wild sugarcane  cultivars.
But  his crew was  more attracted  to brown girls.
The purpose of establishing botanical gardens by  the great  colonial powers,
was primarily  to  serve as  crop introduction stations.  The diffusion of  rubber
from Brazil to Southeast Asia illustrates  their role.  When the  process of
vulcanization was  invented - making it  possible to  produce such desirable  pro-
ducts  as  rubber boots,  raincoats and  tyres - the  price of  natural rubber, pro-
duced from wild trees in the Amazon basin of  Brazil, skyrocketed.  Brazil made it
illegal to  export either rubber seeds  or rubber plants.  The British sent a
botanical expedition to Brazil with  the ostensible purpose of  collecting plants
that had medicinal value.  But they also brought back rubber seeds.  The seeds
were first sprouted at  the Royal Botanical Garden at Kew.  The seedlings were1-7
then transferred to  the  botanical gardens  at Kandy  (Ceylon) and  in Singapore.
The Kandy seedlings  died but  the Singapore  seedlings  lived and  became the  foun-
dation stock of  the rubber  industry  in South East Asia.
In  the early post World War II  period  the diffusion model provided the
intellectual foundation for  technical assistance to developing countries.
President Truman talked  about American "know-how - show-how."  The naive  dif-
fusion approach drew on the empirical observation of  substantial differences  in
land and labor productivity among farmers  and  regions.  The  route to agri-
cultural development  in this view was  through more effective dissemination of
technical knowledge and  the narrowing of  productivity differences.
The diffusion model has  provided  the major  intellectual foundation of much
of  the research and extension effort in farm management  and production economics
since the emergence, in the  latter years  of  the nineteenth  century,  of  agri-
cultural economics  and rural sociology  as  separate subdisciplines  linking the
agricultural and the social sciences.  Developments  leading  to the establishment
of  active programs  of  farm management research and extension occurred at  a time
when experiment station research was making only a modest contribution to agri-
cultural productivity growth.  A further contribution to  the effective  diffusion
of known technology was provided  by  rural sociologists'  research on the  dif-
fusion process.  Models were developed emphasizing the  relationship between dif-
fusion rates  and the  personality characteristics and educational accomplishments
of  farm operators.
Insights  into the  dynamics  of  the diffusion process, when coupled with  the
observation of wide agricultural productivity gaps  among developed and  less
developed countries  and a presumption of  inefficient resource allocation among
"irrational tradition-bound" peasants, produced an extension or  diffusion bias
in the  choice  of agricultural development strategy in many LDCs  during the1-8
1950s.  During the  1960s  the  limitations of  the diffusion on technology  transfer
model as  a foundation for  the design  of  agricultural  development policies  became
increasingly apparent as  technical  assistance and  rural  development programs
- based explicitly or  implicitly on this  model - failed to generate either
rapid modernization of  traditional farms  and communities  or rapid growth  in
agricultural output.  There were very few opportunities  to generate large pro-
ductivity gains through  the transfer of  technology from one agroclimatic  zone to
another, or  even among regions  in  the  same agroclimatic zone.  The pipeline was
empty!
The High-Payoff  Input Model
The  inadequacy  of  policies  based  on  the  conservation,  urban-industrial
impact, and diffusion models  led,  in the  1960s,  to a new perspective:  The key
to transforming a traditional agricultural  sector  into a productive source of
economic growth is  investment designed  to  make modern, high-payoff  inputs
available  to  farmers  in poor countries.  Peasants  in traditional agricultural
systems were viewed as  rational,  efficient  resource allocators.
In Transforming Traditional Agriculture, T. W. Schultz  insisted that
peasants in traditional societies  remained poor because there were  only limited
technical and economic opportunities to which they  could respond.  The new,
high-payoff  inputs were classified according to  three categories:  (1) the  capa-
city  of  public and private  sector research institutions  to produce  new technical
knowledge;  (2) the  capacity  of  the  industrial sector to  develop, produce, and
market new  technical inputs;  and  (3) the  capacity of  farmers  to acquire new
knowledge and use new inputs  effectively.
The enthusiasm with which the high-payoff input model has  been accepted and
translated into economic doctrine has  been due  in part  to  the proliferation of
studies reporting high rates of  return  to public investment in agricultural1-9
research  (Table 1.0).  It  was  also due  to  the success  of  efforts  to  develop new,
high-productivity grain varieties  suitable for  the  tropics.  New, high-yielding
wheat varieties were developed in Mexico beginning in  the  1950s,  and new, high-
yielding rice varieties were developed in  the Philippines  in the  1960s.  These
varieties were highly  responsive to  industrial inputs such as  fertilizer and
other chemicals and to  more effective soil  and water management.  The high
returns  associated with the adoption of  the new varieties and  the associated
technical inputs and management  practices have led to  rapid growth  in investment
in agricultural research and  to  the development  and adoption of  the new and more
productive crop varieties  among farmers  in a number of  countries  in Asia,
Africa,  and  Latin  America.
But  the acceptance of  the high-payoff  input model has  been incomplete.
Many countries have not  yet  freed their private sector to produce and market
the new  technical inputs  that  enhance productivity.  Those are functions which
the  public sector typically performs poorly.  The  constraints placed on market
development  continue to  deprive farmers and consumers  of  the gains  from new
technology that is becoming available.
There has  been even greater reluctance,  in a number of developing
countries,  to accept the  implication of  the high input model for  the  schooling
of  farm people.  The intellectuals  and planners in many developing countries
find it  difficult to understand the  importance, for  agricultural development, of
a literate and a numerate peasantry.  When advances in agricultural technology
occurred slowly the apprenticeship mode of  learning, without formal schooling,
from family and village elders was adequate.  But when a continuous stream of
new biological and mechanical  technology becomes available the  returns  to  the
acquisition of new skills  in production and marketing are driven up.  It  becomes
important not only  to accept  but also  to  be able  to adapt  or  reject the new1-10
"packages"  of  practices  and  inputs  being  recommended  by  research  and  extension
services.  Agricultural extension services  themselves must  be  able  to advance
beyond simply  recommending a package of  practices  or delivering technological
and managerial messages  to farmers.  They must  advance from teaching practices
to  teaching  principles!
It  seems  quite clear that Pakistan has  not yet  made the investment  in the
schooling  of  rural  people  to  enable  it  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  potentially
high-payoff  technology that  is  becoming available.  In spite of  one of  the
world's great  pieces  of  agricultural real estate - 35  million acres  of  irrigated
land in the Indus basin - yields  remain low by Asian standards.  It  is  hard  to
avoid a conclusion that  underinvestment  in human capital has dampened the  rate
of  return to  investment in land and water development  and  to agricultural
research  and  extension.
INDUCED TECHNICAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE
The high-payoff  input model remains incomplete as  a theory of agricultural
development.  Typically,  education and research are public goods not  traded
through  the marketplace.  The mechanism by which resources are allocated among
education, research, and other public and private  sector economic activities was
not fully incorporated into  the model.  It  does not explain how economic con-
ditions  induce the development  and adoption of  an efficient set  of  technologies
for a particular society.  Nor does it  attempt  to specify the processes  by which
input and product price relationships induce investment in research in a direc-
tion consistent with a nation's particular  resource endowments.
These limitations in the high-payoff  input model led Yujiro Hayami and I
to develop a model of  agricultural  development  in which technical change is1-11
treated as  an exogenous  factor.  This induced  innovation perspective was stimu-
lated  by historical  evidence that different  countries  had  followed alternative
paths  of  technical change in the process  of  agricultural development.  In  the
induced innovation model changes or differences  in  the economic environment
influence  the  direction  of  technical  change.
In discussing the induced  innovation Model, I will find  it useful, at  the
risk of  some oversimplification, to use  the term mechanical  technology to  refer
to those technologies which substitute for  labor and  the term biological tech-
nology to  refer to  those technologies which generate increases  in output  per
hectare.
Mechanical and Biological Processes  in Agricultural Production
The mechanization of  agricultural production cannot be  treated  as  simply
an adaptation of  industrial methods of  production to agriculture.  The  spatial
nature of  agricultural production  results  in significant differences between
agriculture and  industry in patterns  of machine use.  It  imposes  severe  limits
on the efficiency  of  large  scale production in agriculture.
The spatial dimension of  crop production requires that  the machines
suitable for agricultural  production must  be mobile - they must move across or
through materials  that are  immobile in contrast to moving material  through sta-
tionary machines as  in  most industrial processes.  Furthermore, the  seasonal or
spatial characteristics  of  agricultural production requires a series  of  special-
ized machines - for  land preparation, planting, weed control and harvesting -
specifically  designed for  sequential operations, each  of which is  carried  out
for only a few days  or weeks in each season.  This means that  it  is  no more
feasible for workers  to specialize  in one  operation in mechanized agriculture
than in premechanized agriculture.  It  also means  that  in a  "fully mechanized"1-12
agricultural system the capital-labor ratio  tends  to  be much higher than in  the
industrial sector  in the  same country.
In  agriculture biological and  chemical processes are  more fundamental  than
mechanization or machine processes.  This generalization was equally true  during
the  last century as  it will be  during the era  of  the  "new biotechnology".
Advances  in biological  and chemical technology  in crop production have  typically
involved one  or more  of  the following  three elements:  (a) land and water
resource development  to provide a more satisfactory  environment  for plant
growth;  (b)  modification of  the environment  by  the addition of  organic and
inorganic sources  of  plant  nutrients  to  the  soil to  stimulate plant growth;  (c)
use  of  biological and chemical means  to protect plants from pests and disease;
and  (d) selection and design of  new biologically  efficient crop varieties
specifically adapted to  respond  to  those elements in  the environment  that  are
subject  to  mans  control.  Similar processes  can be observed  in advances  in
animal  agriculture.
Induced Technical Change:  The United States  and Japan
One implication of  the discussion of  mechanical and biological processes is
that  there are multiple  paths of  technical  change in agriculture available to a
society.  The constraints  imposed by an inelastic supply of  land, may be  offset
by advances  in  biological technology.  The  constraints imposed by  an inelastic
supply  of  labor may be  offset by  advances  in mechanical technology.  These
alternatives  are illustrated  in Figure 1. The 1880-1980  land and labor produc-
tivity  growth paths  for Japan, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and
the United States,  are plotted along with the  1980 partial productivity  ratios
for a number of  developing countries.  The impression given by  the  several
growth paths is  that nature  is  relatively "plastic."1-13
In economics it  had generally  been accepted, at  least  since  the publication
of Theory of Wages by  Sir John Hicks,  that  changes  or  differences  in the  rela-
tive  prices  of  factors  of  production could influence the  direction of  invention
or innovation.  There has  also  been a second  tradition, based on the work of
Griliches and Schmookler,  that  has  focused attention on the influence  of  growth
in product demand on the  rate of  technical  change.  A model of  induced technical
change  in agriculture  is presented in Appendix A.  We now  turn to an illustra-
tion of  the  role  of  relative factor endowments and  prices in the evolution of
alternative  paths of  technical  change in  agriculture in the United States and
Japan.
Japan and the United States are  characterized by extreme differences in
relative  endowments of  land and  labor  (Table 2).  In 1880,  total agricultural
land area per male worker was more than sixty  times  as  large in the United
States  as  in Japan, and arable  land area per worker was about  twenty times  as
large in the United States  as  in Japan.  The differences have widened over time.
By 1980 total agricultural land area per  male worker was  more than one hundred
times  as  large  and arable  land area per male worker about fifty times  as  large
in  the United States as  in Japan.
The relative prices  of  land and  labor also differed sharply  in  the  two
countries.  In  1880 in order  to buy  a hectare of  arable  land  (compare row 8 and
row 16  in Table 2),  it would have been necessary for  a Japanese hired  farm
worker to work eight  times  as  many days  as  a U.S.  farm worker.  In the United
States the price of  labor  rose relative to  the price of  land, particularly be-
tween 1880 and 1920.  In Japan the price  of  land rose  sharply relative to  the
price of labor,  particularly between 1880  and  1900.  By 1960 a Japanese farm
worker would have  had.to work thirty times  as  many days as  a U.S.  farm worker
in order to buy one hectare  of  arable land.  This gap was reduced after  19601-14
partly  due  to  extremely  rapid  increases  in  wage  rates  in  Japan  during  the  two
decades  of  "miraculous"  economic  growth.  In  the  United  States  land  prices  rose
sharply  in  the  postwar  period  primarily  because  of  the  rising  demand  for  land
for nonagricultural use and  the anticipation of  continued inflation.  Yet,  in
1980 a Japanese farm worker still would have had to work eleven times  as  many
days  as  a  U.S. worker  to  buy  one  hectare  of  land.
In spite of  these substantial differences  in  land area per worker and in
the relative  prices of  land and labor,  both the United States and Japan
experienced relatively  rapid rates  of  growth in production and productivity  in
agriculture  (Tables 3 and 4).  Overall agricultural growth performance for the
entire one-hundred-year period was very  similar in the two  countries.  In both
countries  total agricultural output increased at  an annual  compound rate of  1.6
percent while total inputs  (aggregate of  conventional inputs) increased at  a
rate  of  0.7  percent.  Total factor productivity (total output divided by  total
input) increased at an annual rate of 0.9  percent  in both countries.  Meanwhile,
labor productivity measured  by agricultural output per male worker increased at
rates of  3.1  percent  per year in the United States and 2.7 percent in Japan.  It
is  remarkable that  the overall growth  rates  in output  and productivity were so
similar despite  the extremely different  factor proportions which characterize
the  two  countries.
Although there is  a resemblance  in the  overall rates of  growth in produc-
tion and productivity, the  time sequences  of  the relatively fast-growing phases
and  the relatively stagnant phases differ between the  two countries.  In  the
United States agricultural output grew rapidly up to  1900;  then  the growth rate
decelerated.  From the  1900s  to  the 1930s  the was  little gain in total produc-
tivity.  This stagnation phase was succeeded by  a dramatic rise in  production
and productivity in the  1940s  and 1950s.  Japan experienced rapid increases in1-15
agricultural production and productivity  from  1880  to  the  1910s,  then entered
into a stagnation phase which lasted until the mid-1930s.  Another rapid expan-
sion phase commenced  during the period  of  recovery from the  devastation of World
War II.  Roughly speaking,  the United States experienced a stagnation phase  two
decades earlier  than Japan and also shifted to  the  second development phase  two
decades earlier.
The effect of  relative prices on the  development and choice  of  technology
is  illustrated with remarkable clarity  for biological  technology in Figure 2.
In Figure 2, U.S.  and Japanese data on the  relationship between fertilizer input
per hectare of arable  land and the fertilizer/land price ratio are  plotted for
the period 1880  to  1980.  In  both 1880  and  1980 U.S.  farmers were using less
fertilizer than Japanese farmers.  However, despite enormous  differences  in  both
physical and institutional resources,  the  relationship between  these variables
has  been almost identical  in  the  two countries.  As  the price of  fertilizer
declined relative  to other factors,  scientists  in both countries  responded by
inventing crop varieties  that  were more responsive to the  lower prices of
fertilizer.  American scientists,  however, always  lagged behind the Japanese by
several decades because the  lower prices of  land  relative to the  price of  fer-
tilizer in the United States  resulted in a lower priority being placed on yield-
increasing  technology.
The effect of  changes  in the relative prices of  mechanical power and  labor
in  the United States and Japan for  1880-1980 is  illustrated in Figure 3.  In
both 1880  and  1980 U.S.  farmers were using more mechanical power than Japanese
farmers.  But  the relationship between  the power-labor price ratio and the use
of  power per worker  is again, almost  identical in the  two countries.  But
because labor was  always less expensive  in Japan, the Japanese suppliers  of
mechanical technology always  lagged behind U.S.  suppliers  by  several decades.1-16
These  same relationships  that  hold  for Japan and  the United States have now been
demonstrated for  the period 1880-1960 for  a number  of  European countries  in  the
book by Hans P. Binswanger and Vernon W. Ruttan, Induced Innovation:
Technology, Institutions and Development.
The effect  of a rise  in the price of  fertilizer relative  to  the price of
land or of  the price of  labor relative  to  the price  of machinery has been to
induce advances  in biological and mechanical  technology.  The effect of  the
introduction of  lower cost  and  more productive  biological and mechanical  tech-
nology has been  to  induce  farmers  to substitute fertilizer for  land and mechani-
cal power for  labor.  These  responses to  differences in resource  endowments
among countries and to  changes  in  resource endowments over time by  agricultural
research institutions,  by  the farm supply  industries, and by farmers,  has  been
remarkably  similar  in  spite  of  differences  in  cultures  and  traditions.
The results of  our  comparative analyses can  be summarized as  follows:
Agricultural growth in  the United States and Japan during the period  1880-1980
can best be understood when viewed as  a dynamic factor substitution process.
Factors have been substituted for each other along a metaproduction function in
response to  long-run trends  in  relative factor prices.  Each point on  the
metaproduction surface is  characterized by  a technology which can be  described
in terms  of  specific sources  of  power,  types  of  machinery,  crop varieties,  and
animal breeds.  Movements along this metaproduction surface involve  technical
changes.  These technical  changes have been induced to a significant extent by
the  long-term trends  in  relative factor prices.
PERSPECTIVE
In closing decades of  twentieth century we are  approaching the  end of  the
most remarkable  transitions in the history of  agriculture.1-17
Prior to  the beginning of  this  century almost  all  increases in agricultural
production occurred as  a result of  increases  in  area cultivated.  The major
exceptions were in Western Europe, where  livestock  based conservation systems  of
farming had developed, and  in East Asia, where wet  rice cultivation  systems  had
developed.
But by  the end of  this  century there will be  few  significant areas where
agricultural production can be expanded  by  simply adding more  land to produc-
tion.  Expansion of  agricultural output will have  to  be obtained almost  entirely
from more  intensive  cultivation of  the areas already  being used for  agricultural
production.  Increases  in food and  fiber production will depend, in  large
measure, on continuous advances  in agricultural technology.
The task before us  is  clear.  It  is  imperative, over the next  several
decades, that we complete the establishment of  agricultural research capacity
for each commodity of  economic significance  in each agroclimatic region of  the
world.
A developing country which fails  to evolve a capacity for technical  and
institutional innovation in agriculture  consistent with its  resource and
cultural endowments suffers  two major  constraints on  its  attempts to develop a
productive agriculture.  It  is  unable to  take advantage  of  advances  in biologi-
cal and  chemical technologies suited  to  labor-intensive agricultural systems.
And the mechanical technology it  does import  from more developed countries will
be  productive  only under conditions  of  large-scale agricultural  organization.
It  will contribute to  the emergence of  a "bimodal" rather  than a "unimodal"
organization structure.
During the  last two decades  a number  of  developing countries have  begun to
establish the institutional capacity  to generate technical changes  adapted to
national and regional resource endowments.  More recently these  emerging1-18
national systems  have been buttressed by a new system of  international  crop and
animal research institutes.  These new institutes have become both important
sources of  new knowledge and technology and increasingly effective  communication
links  among the developing national  research systems.
The lag in shifting from a natural-resource-based  to a science-based system
of agriculture  continues to  be a source of  national differences  in  land and
labor productivity.  Lags in the development  and application of knowledge are
also important sources  of  regional productivity differences within countries.
In countries  such as Mexico and Pakistan, differential rates  of  technical  change
have  been an important source of  the widening disparities  in the  rate of  growth
of  total agricultural output,  in labor  and land  productivity, and in incomes  and
wage rates among regions.
Productivity differences  in agriculture  are increasingly a function of
investments  in scientific and industrial capacity and  in the education of  rural
people rather than of natural  resource endowments.  The effects  of education on
productivity are particularly  important during periods  in which a nation's  agri-
cultural research system begins to  introduce new technology.  In an agricultural
system characterized by  static technology,  there are  few gains  to  be realized
from education in rural areas.  Rural people who have lived for generations with
essentially the same  resources and  the same  technology have learned from long
experience what their efforts  can get  out  of  the  resources available to  them.
Children acquire from their parents the skills  that are worthwhile.  Formal
schooling has  little economic value in agricultural production.
As soon as  new technical opportunities  become available, this  situation
changes.  Technical change requires  the acquisition of  new husbandry skills;
acquisition from nontraditional sources  of  additional resources  such as  new1-19
seeds,  new  chemicals,  and  new  equipment;  and  development  of  new  skills  in
dealing with both natural  resources  and with the  input and  product market  insti-
tutions  that  link agriculture with the nonagricultural sector.
The processes  by which new knowledge can  be applied  to alter  the  rate and
direction of  technical  change in  agriculture, are, however, substantially
greater than our knowledge of  the processes  by which resources  are brought  to
bear on the process  of  institutional  innovation and transfer.  Yet  the need for
viable institutions  capable  of  supporting more  rapid agricultural growth and
rural development  is  even more compelling today than  a decade  ago.  I will

















AGRICULTURAL  OUTPUT  PER  MALE
Figure  1.
WORKER  (LOG.  SCALE)
Historical  growth  paths  of  agricultural  productivity  of  Denmark,
France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States  for
1880-1980,  compared  with  intercountry  cross-section  observations
of  selected countries in 1980.  Values  in parentheses are percent
of male workers employed in nonagriculture.  Data from Appendixes
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FERTILIZER-ARABLE  LAND  PRICE  RATIO  (LOG.)
Relation between fertilizer input  per hectare of arable land and fertilizer-
arable land price ratio  (=  hectares  of arable land which can be purchased
by one  ton of N +  P20 5  + K20  contained in commercial fertilizers),  the
United States  and Japan, quinquennial observations for 1880-1980.  Data
from Appendix C, Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development, rev. ed.
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POWER-LABOR  PRICE  RATIO  (LOG.)
Figure  3. Relation between farm draft power per male worker and power-labor price
ratio  (=  hectares of work days which can be purchased by one horsepower
of tractor or draft animal),  the United States and Japan, quinquennial
observations for 1880-1980.  Data from Appendix C, Hayami and Ruttan,
Agricultural Development, rev. ed.  Number  of male  workers  =  U3  and  J3,
Power =  U7 + U8 and J7 + J8, Land price =  U19 and J19, Power price =
average  retail  price  of  tractor  per  horsepower  extrapolated  by  U21  from  the
1976-80 average of $216 for  the United States, and extrapolated by J21
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Table  1.0  Summary  Studies  of  Agricultural  Research  Productivity
Annual  Internal
Time  Rate  of Return











Ayer and Schuh,  1972
Hines, 1972
Hayami and Akino,  1977
Hayami and Akino, 1977
Hertford,  Ardila,
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Table  1.0  continued
Annual  Internal
Time  Rate  of Return






Evenson  and Jha,  1973
Cline, 1975
(revised  by Knutson
and Tweeten,  1979)
Bredahl and  Peterson,
1976
Kahlon,  Bal, Saxena,
and Jha,  T977
Evenson  and Flores,
1978
Flores,  Evenson,  and
Hayami,  1978


































































































































1948-1971  110 - -1-26
Source:  Robert  E. Evenson,  Paul  E. Waggoner,  and  Vernon  W. Ruttan,  Economic  Benefits
from  Research:  An  Example  from  Agriculture,"  Science,  205  (September  14,  1979),  pp.
1101-7.  Copyright  1979  by  the  American  Association  for  the  Advancement  of Science.
a. Returns  to maize  research  only.
b. Returns to maize  research plus cultivation "package."
c. Lower  estimate  for  13-,  and  higher for  16-year time  lag  between  beginning  and end of
output impact.
d. Lagged  marginal  product of 1969  research  on output  discounted for an estimated  mean
Slag of 5 years for cash grains, 6  years for poultry and dairy, and 7 years for livestock.
Sources  for  Table  10.3:  The  results  of  many  of  the  studies  reported  in  this  table  have
previously  been summarized  in  the following works.
Thomas  M. Arndt,  Dana  G. Dalrymple,  and  Vernon  W. Ruttan,  eds.,  Resource  Allocation
and  Productivity  in  National  and  International  Agricultural  Research  (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press,  1977),  p. 6, 7.
James  K.  Boyce  and  Robert  E. Evenson,  Agricultural  Research  and  Extension  Systems
(New York:  Agricultural Development Council,  1975),  p.  104.
Robert  Evenson,  Paul  E. Waggoner,  and  Vernon  W. Ruttan,  "Economic  Benefits  from
Research:  An  Example  from  Agriculture,"  Science,  205  (September  14,  1979),  pp.
1101-7.
Robert  J. R. Sim  and  Richard  Gardner,  A Review of Research and Extension  Evaluation in
Agriculture  (Moscow,  Idaho:  University  of  Idaho,  Department  of  Agricultural  Econo-
mics Research  Series 214,  May  1978),  pp. 41,  42.
The sources for individual studies are
H. Ayer,  "The  Costs,  Returns  and  Effects  of  Agricultural  Research  in  Slo Paulo,  Brazil"
(Ph.D. dissertation,  Purdue  University, 1970).
H. W. Ayer  and  G. E. Schuh,  "Social  Rates of Return  and  Other  Aspects of Agricultural
Research:  The  Case  of  Cotton  Research  in  Slo  Paulo,  Brazil,"  American  journal of
Agricultural Economics,  54 (November  1972),  pp. 557-69.
N. Ardito  Barletta,  "Costs  and  Social  Benefits of Agricultural  Research  in  Mexico"  (Ph.D.
dissertation,  University of Chicago,  1970).
M. Bredahl  and  W. Peterson,  "The  Productivity  and  Allocation  of Research:  U.S.  Agricul-
tural  Experiment Stations,"  American journal of Agricultural  Economics, 58  (November
1976),  pp. 684-92.
Philip  L.  Cline,  "Sources  of  Productivity  Change  in  United  States  Agriculture"  (Ph.D.
dissertation,  Oklahoma State  University,  1975).
Jeffrey  S. Davis,  "Stability  of  the  Research  Production  Coefficient for  U.S.  Agriculture,"
(Ph.D. dissertation,  University of Minnesota,  1979).
R. C.  Duncan,  "Evaluating  Returns  to  Research  in  Pasture  Improvement,"  Australian
Journal of Agricultural Economics,  16 (December  1972),  pp.  153-68.
R. Evenson,  "The  Contribution  of  Agricultural  Research  and  Extension  to  Agricultural
Production"  (Ph.D. dissertation,  University of Chicago,  1968).
R. Evenson,  "International  Transmission  of  Technology  in  Sugarcane  Production"  (New
Haven, Conn:  Yale University, Mimeographed  paper,  1969).
R. E. Evenson  and  P. Flores,  Economic  Consequences  of  New  Rice  Technology  in  Asia,
Los Banos,  Laguna,  Philippines: International  Rice  Research  Institute, 1978.
R. E. Evenson  and  D. jha, "The  Contribution  of  Agricultural  Research  Systems  to Agri-
cultural  Production  in  India,"  Indian  journal  of  Agricultural  Economics,  28  (1973),
pp. 212-30.
P. Flores,  R. E. Evenson,  Y.  Hayami,  "Social  Returns  to  Rice  Research  in  the Philippines:
Domestic  Benefits  and  Foreign  Spillover,"  Economic  Development and Cultural Change,
26 (April  1978),  pp. 591-607.1-27
Z. Griliches,  "Research  Costs  and  Social  Returns:  Hybrid  Corn  and  Related  Innovations,"
journal of Political Economy,  66 (1958),  pp. 419-31.
Z. Griliches,  "Research  Expenditures,  Education  and  the  Aggregate  Agricultural Production
Function,"  American Economic  Review, 54  (December  1964),  pp. 961-74.
Y. Hayami  and  M. Akino,  "Organization  and Productivity of Agricultural  Research  Systems
in  Japan,"  in  Resource  Allocation and Productivity  in  National and  International  Agri-
cultural  Research,  Thomas  M. Arndt,  Dana  G. Dalrymple,  and  Vernon  W. Ruttan,  eds.
(Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota  Press, 1977),  pp. 29-59.
R. Hertford,  J.  Ardila,  A. Rocha,  and  G.  Trujillo, "Productivity  of Agricultural  Research  in
Colombia,"  in  Resource  Allocation  and  Productivity  in  National  and  international
Agricultural  Research,  Thomas  M. Arndt,  Dana  G. Dalrymple,  and  Vernon  W. Ruttan,
eds.  (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1977),  pp. 86-123.
J.  Hines, "The  Utilization of Research for Development: Two  Case Studies in  Rural Modern-
ization and Agriculture  in Peru"  (Ph.D. dissertation,  Princeton University, 1972).
A. S. Kahlon,  H. K. Bal,  P. N. Saxena,  and  D. Jha,  "Returns  to  Investment  in  Research  in
India,"  in  Resource  Allocation  and Productivity  in National and International Agricul-
tural  Research,  University of Minnesota  Press, 1977),  pp.  124-47.
M. Knutson  and  Luther  G. Tweeten,  "Toward  an  Optimal  Rate  of Growth  in  Agricultural
Production  Research  and  Extension,"  American  journal  of Agricultural  Economics,
61  (February  1979),  pp. 70-76.
R. Latimer,  "Some  Economic  Aspects  of Agricultural  Research  and  Extension in the U.S."
(Ph.D.  dissertation, Purdue  University,  1964).
J. G. Nagy  and  W. H. Furtan,  "Economic  Costs  and  Returns  from  Crop  Development
Research:  The  Case  of  Rapeseed  Breeding  in  Canada,"  Canadian Journal of Agricultural
Economics 26, (February  1978),  pp.  1-14.
T.  Y.  Pee,  "Social  Returns  from  Rubber  Research  on  Peninsular  Malaysia"  (Ph.D.  disserta-
tion, Michigan  State University,  1977)
W. L. Peterson,  "Return  to  Poultry  Research  in  the  United  States,"  journal of  Farm  Eco-
nomics, 49 (August 1967),  pp. 656-69.
W. L. Peterson and  J.  C. Fitzharris,  "The  Organization and  Productivity of the Federal State
Research  System  in  the  United  States,"  in  Resource  Allocation  and Productivity  in
National and International Agricultural Research,  Thomas M. Arndt, Dana  G. Dalrymple,
and  Vernon  W. Ruttan,  eds.  (Minneapolis:  University  of  Minnesota  Press,  1977),  pp.
60-85.
C. E.  Pray,  "The  Economics of Agricultural  Research in  British Punjab and  Pakistani Punjab,
1905-1975"  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  University of Pennsylvania, 1978).
C. E. Pray,  "The  Economics  of Agricultural  Research  in  Bangladesh,"  Bangladesh  journal
of Agricultural Economics, 2 (December  1979),  pp. 1-36.
A.  Schmitz  and  D. Seckler,  "Mechanized  Agriculture  and  Social  Welfare:  The  Case of the
Tomato  Harvester,"  American  journal of Agricultural Economics, 52  (November  1970),
pp.  569-77.
G. M. Scobie and  R,  Posada  T.,  "The  Impact of Technical Change  on  Income  Distribution:
The  Case  of Rice  in Colombia,"  American  journal of Agricultural  Economics, 60 (Feb-
ruary 1978),  pp.  85-92.
A.  Tang,  "Research  and  Education  in  Japanese  Agricultural  Development,"  Economic
Studies Quarterly,  13 (February-May  1963),  pp. 27-41  and  91-99.
E. B. Wennergren  and  M. D. Whitaker,  "Social  Return  to  U.S.  Technical  Assistance  in
Bolivian  Agriculture: The  Case  of Sheep  and  Wheat,"  American  journal of Agricultural
Economics, 59 (August  1977),  pp.  565-69.
In addition  to  the  studies  listed  in  the  table,  there  have  been  several other  important re-
search  impact studies  in  which  results are  reported  in a cost-benefit rather than an  internal
rate of return format.
L.  L.  Bauer  and  C. R. Hancock,  "The  Productivity of Agricultural  Research  and  Extension
Expenditures in  the  Southeast,"  Southern journal of Agricultural Economics, 7 Decem-
ber 1975),  pp. 177-22.
J. S. Marsden,  G.  E. Martin,  D.  J. Parham,  T.  J. Risdill, and  B. G.  Johnston,  Returns  on
Australian  Agricultural  Research:  The  joint Industries Assistance  Commission-CSIRO
Benefit-Cost  Study  of the  CSIRO  Division  of Entomology  (Canberra:  Commonwealth
Scientific and  Industrial  Research Organization, 1980).
H.  Graham  Purchase,  "The  Etiology  and  Control  of Marek's  Disease  of Chickens and  the
Economic  Impact of a Successful  Research  Program,"  in  Virology in Agriculture:  Belts-
ville  Symposium  in  Agricultural  Research-I,  John  A.  Romberger,  ed.  (Montclair,  N.J.:
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Average Annual Rates of  Change (Percentage per Year) in Output,
Inputs,  and Productivity in U.S. Agriculture, 1870-1979.
1870-1900  1900-1925  1925-1950  1950-1965  1965-1982
Farm output  2.9  0.9  1.6  1.7  2.1
Total inputs  1.9  1.1  0.2  -0.4  0.2
Total productivity  1.0  -0.2  1.3  2.2  1.8
Labor inputs a   1.6  0.5  -1.7  -4.8  -3.4
Labor  productivity  1.3  0.4  3.3  6.6  5.8
Land inputsb  3.1  0.8  0.1  -0.9  0.0
Land productivity  -0.2  0.0  1.4  2.6  1.8
Sources:  Data from USDA, Changes  in Farm Production  and Efficiency
(Washington,  D.C.:  1979);  and  D. D. Durost  and  G. T. Barton,  Changing
Sources of  Farm Output  (Washington, D.C.:  USDA Production Research Report
No.  36).  February  1960.  Data are three-year averages  centered on the year
shown  for  1925,  1950,  and  1965.
a.  Number  of  workers,  1870-1910;  worker-hour  basis,  1910-1971.
b. Cropland use for  crops, including crop  failures and cultivated  summer
fallow.
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Table  4.  Average Annual Change in Total Output, Inputs,  and Productivity
in Japanese Agriculture,  1880- 1980.
Item  1880-1920  1920-1935  1935-1955  1955-1965  1965-1980
Farm output  1.8  0.9  0.6  3.5  1.2
Total inputs  0.5  0.5  1.2  1.3  0.7
Total productivity  1.3  0.4  -0.6  2.2  0.5
Labor inputs  -0.3  -0.2  0.6  -2.5  -3.7
Labor productivity  2.1  1.1  0.0  6.0  4.9
Land inputs  0.6  0.1  -0.1  0.1  -0.6
Land productivity  1.2  0.8  0.7  3.4  1.8
Sources:  Data from Saburo Yamada and Yujiro Hayami,  "Agricultural Growth in
Japan, 1880-1970,"  in Agricultural Growth in  Japan, Taiwan, Korea and the
Philippines, Yujiro Hayami, Vernon W.  Ruttan, and Herman Southworth, eds.
(Honolulu: University Press  of Hawaii,  1979),  pp.  33-58;  Saburo Yamada,
"The Secular Trends  in  Input-Output Relations  of Agricultural Production in
Japan, 1878-1978,"  a  paper presented at  the Conference of Agricultural
Development in  China, Japan, and Korea, Academica Sinica, Taipei, December
17-20,  1980;  Saburo Yamada, Country Study on Agricultural Productivity
Measurement and Analysis - Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Institute of
Oriental Culture, October 1984,  mimeo).Revised  Draft
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Lecture  Two
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT2-1
Over the  last  several decades economists have made major  contributions
to  our understanding of  the impact  of  natural science knowledge on  technical
change and the impact  of  technical change  on  economic growth.  We  have also
significantly advanced our understanding of  the sources  of demand  for and
supply  of  technical  change.
In work published in the early  1970s Yujiro Hayami and I extended the
theory of  induced technical  change and tested it  against  the history of
agricultural development  in  the United States and Japan.  It  is  now generally
accepted that the theory  of  induced technical  change provides very substantial
insight  into the process of  agricultural  development  for a wide  range of
developed and developing countries.  And economic historians  are increasingly
drawing on the theory of  induced  technical change in attempting  to interpret
differential patterns  of  productivity growth among countries and over time.
The central elemehts of  the theory of  induced technical change were discussed
yesterday  in  my  first  lecture.
The demonstration that technical change can be  treated as largely
endogenbus  to the development process  does not  imply that  the progress of
either agricultural or  industrial technology can be  left to an  'invisible
hand' that  drives  technology along an  'efficient' path determined by
relative resource endowments.  The  capacity to advance knowledge  in science
and  technology is  itself  a product  of  institutional innovation.  Whitehead has
insisted that "the great invention of  the nineteenth century was  the invention
of  the method of invention."
In  the case of  agriculture, for example, in both Japan and the United
States, much of  the technical change that has  led  to  growth of  output per
hectare has  been produced by  public sector  institutions.  These  institutions--
state (or prefectoral) and federal  (or national) agricultural experiment2-2
stations--obtain their  resources  in the political market place and allocate
their resources  through bureaucratic mechanisms.  The success  of  the  theory
of  induced technical  change gives rise,  therefore, to  the need for a more
careful consideration of  the sources of  institutional innovation and design.
In  this paper I elaborate a theory of  institutional innovation in
which  shifts  in  the  demand  for  institutional  change  are  induced  by  changes
in  relative resource endowments and by  technical  change.  I also consider
the impact of  advances  in social science knowledge and  of  cultural endowments
on  the supply of  institutional  change.  After examining the  forces  that  act
to shift  the demand and supply  of  institutional change I  then present  the
elements of  a more general model of  institutional  change.  The perspective
on  the role  of  institutional change in  the process  of economic development
presented in this  paper is  much more positive than  the views  that were held
by the American institutional school or  in  the recent  literature on social
choice  and collective action.
WHAT  IS INSTITUTIONAL  INNOVATION?
Institutions  are the rules  of  a society or of  organizations  that
facilitate coordination among people by helping  them form expectations which
each person can reasonably hold in dealing with others.  They reflect  the
conventions  that have evolved in different  societies  regarding the behavior
of  individuals  and groups  relative to their  own behavior and the behavior
of  others.  In  the area of economic relations  they have a crucial role
in establishing expectations about  the rights  to use resources  in economic
activities and about the partitioning of  the  income streams resulting from
economic activity--'institutions provide assurance respecting the actions
of  others, and give order and stability to expectations  in the  complex and
uncertain world of  economic relations.'2-3
In  order to perform  the essential role  of  forming reasonable expecta-
tions  in dealings  among people, institutions must  be  stable for an extended
time period.  But  institutions,  like technology, must  also change if
development  is  to  occur.  Anticipation  of  the  latent  gains  to  be  realized
by overcoming the disequilibria resulting  from changes  in factor endowments,
product demand, and technical change represents  powerful sources  of  demand for
institutional innovation.  Institutions  that  have been efficient  in  generating
growth in the past may,  over time,  become  obstacles  to  further economic
development.  The growing disequilibria in resource allocation due to
institutional constraints  on the opportunities  for economic  growth create
an environment in which it  becomes profitable for  political entrepreneurs
or leaders  to organize collective action to bring about  institutional  change.
This  perspective on the  sources of  demand for institutional change is
similar, in some  respects,  to  the  traditional Marxian view.  Marx considered
technological change  as  a primary source of  institutional change.  'At a
certain stage of  their development,  the material forces of  production in
society  come  in conflict with the existing relations  of  production, or--what
is  but a legal expression for  the same  thing--with  the property relations
within which they had been at work  before.  From forms  of  development of  the
forces  of  production these  relations  turn into their fetters.  Then  comes
the period of  social revolution.  With the change of  the economic foundation
the entire  immense super-structure  is  more  or  less rapidly  transformed.'
The view  that Professor Hayami and I have used in our work is  somewhat
more complex.  We  consider that changes  in factor endowments and  product
demand are equally important sources of  institutional change.  Nor  is
institutional change limited  .to the  dramatic or revolutionary changes  of2-4
the  type anticipated by Marx.  Basic institutions  such as  property rights
and markets  are  more typically  altered through  the cumulation of  'secondary'
or  incremental institutional changes  such  as modifications  in  contractual
relations  or shifts  in  the boundaries  between market and nonmarket activities.
There is  a supply  as well as a demand dimension in institutional change.
Collective action leading to  changes  in  the supply of  institutional innovations
may be generated by  tension among interest groups.  Clearly, the process  is
much more complex than the simple  class conflict  between those who derive
their income  from the ownership of  property and  those who derive  their income
from labor.  The supply of  institutional innovations  is  strongly influenced
by  the cost  of  achieving social consensus  (or of suppressing opposition).
The cost  of  institutional change is  dependent on the  distribution of
political resources.  And  it  also depends  critically on cultural tradition
and -on ideology.
Advances in knowledge in  the social  sciences  (and in related professions
such  as  law,  administration,  planning,  and  social  service)  can  reduce  the
cost  of institutional  change  in a somewhat similar manner as  advances  in
the natural sciences  reduce  the cost  of  technical change.  Education, both
general and  technical, that  facilitates  a better understanding among people
of  their common interests  can also  reduce the cost  of  institutional innovation.
Our insistence that  important advances  in  the understanding of  the
processes of  institutional innovation and diffusion can be  achieved by
treating institutional change  as endogenous  to  the economic system represents
a clear departure  from the  tradition of  modern analytical economics.
This does not  mean that analytical economics must  be  abandoned.  On the
contrary, it  is  suggested that  the  scope of modern analytical economics be
expanded by  treating institutional change as  endogenous.2-5
DEMAND FOR INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION--MARKET INSTITUTIONS
In some  cases  the demand for institutional  innovation can be  satisfied
by  the development of  new forms  of  property rights,  more efficient market
institutions, or even by  evolutionary  changes arising out  of direct
contracting by  individuals  at  the level of  the  community or  the firm.  In
other cases, where externalities  are  involved, substantial political resources
may have  to be  brought  to  bear to  organize nonmarket institutions  in order
to provide for  the supply  of public goods.  It  may  be  useful to  illustrate,
from the  agricultural history of England, Thailand and  the Philippines, how
changes  in factor endowments, technical change,  and  growth in  product demand
have induced change in  property rights  and contractual arrangements  in order
to promote more efficient  resource allocation.
The agricultural  revolution that  occurred in England between the fifteenth
and  the nineteenth centuries  involved a substantial increase in the  productivity
of  land and  labor.  It was  accompanied by  the enclosure of  open fields  and  the
replacement  of  small peasant  cultivators, who  held their land  from manorial
lords,  by a system in which large farmers used hired labor  to  farm the land  they
leased from the  landlords.  The First Enclosure Movement,  in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, resulted in the  conversion of  open arable  fields  and com-
mons  to  private pasture  in areas  suitable for grazing.  It was  induced in
substantial part by  expansion in the export demand for wool.  The Second
Enclosure Movement  in  the eighteenth century  involved conversion of  communally
managed arable  land into privately operated units.
There has been  a continuing debate among students of English agricultural
history about whether  the higher rents  that  landowners  received after
enclosure was  (a) because enclosed farming was more efficient  than open
field farming, or  (b) because enclosures  redistributed income from farmers2-6
to  landowners.  It  is  now agreed, however,  that  it  was  largely  induced by
the growing disequilibrium between the  fixed institutional  rent that
landlords  received under copyhold tenures  (with lifetime contracts) and  the
higher economic rents expected  from adoption of new technology which became
more profitable as  a consequence of higher grain prices  and lower wages.
When the  land was enclosed there was  a redistribution of  income from farmers
to landowners  and the disequilibrium was reduced or  eliminated.
The Thailand example,  based on an exceedingly useful study  by David
Feeny of  the political economy of  Thai agricultural  development, draws on
more  recent economic history.  In Thailand,  at  the middle of  the  last  century,
land was  abundant and  labor was  scarce.  Property rights  in land were
poorly  defined and were  based primarily on occupancy.  But property rights
in people were defined  in almost baroque  complexity.  There were several
gradations in slavery, ranging from war  captives  to debt  shares.  And there
was also a complex system of  servile obligations on  the part of  the peasantry
to the nobility and the king.  Debt  slavery provided a form of  collateral for
credit transactions  in the absence  of well defined property rights  in  land.
One could sell  ones child, ones wife, or  ones self  into debt  slavery with,
under certain conditions, a right  of  redemption.
A shift from "property rights  in man  to property  rights  in land" began
when Thailand opened  itself up.to international  trade,  under British and
French pressure.  The  trend was  reinforced following the  construction of
the Suez  Canal and the reduction in shipping rates to Europe.  The sharp
increase in  the demand for  rice associated with cheaper  access to European
markets made land suitable for  rice production more valuable.  The land
available for  rice production, which had been abundant,  became more2-7
scarce.  Investment in land development  for  rice production became
profitable.  The response was  a major  transformation of  property rights.
Traditional rights  in human property  (corvee and  slavery) were  replaced
by more precise private property  rights  in  land  (fee-simple titles).
These  changes were encouraged by  the king and  his  advisors because it  reduced
the status of  the Thai nobility from that  of  warlords  to  landlords.  And
it was accepted by  the nobility because it  substituted increasingly
valuable land  rights  for  less  valuable feudal privilege.
In Japan, at  the  beginning of  the feudal Tokugawa period  (1603-1867),
peasants' rights  to  cropland had been limited  to  the  rights to  till the soil
with the obligation to pay  a feudal land  tax in kind.  As  the population
grew, commercialization progressed and irrigation and  technology were
developed to make intensive farming more profitable.  Some  peasants divided
their holdings into smaller units  and  leased them out  to ex-servants  or
extended family members.  Some accumulated land through mortgaging arrange-
ments  that made other peasants  de facto tenants.  As  a result  of  the
accumulation of  illegal leasing and  mortgaging practices, peasants'  property
rights in  land approximated those of  a fee-simple title by  the end  of  the
Tokugawa period.  These rights  were readily converted  to the modern
private-property  system in  the succeeding Meiji  period.
Research conducted by Yujiro Hayami and Masao Kikuchi in  the Philippines
during  the late 1970s  has  enabled us  to examine a contemporary example of
the  interrelated effects of  changes  in  resource endowments and  technical
change on the demand for institutional change in  land  tenure and  labor
relations.  The case  is  particularly  interesting because the institutional
innovations occurred as  a result  of  private contracting among individuals.2-8
The study  is  unique in  that  it  is  based on a rigorous analysis  of microeconomic
data in a village over  a period of  about 20  years.
Changes  in Technology  and Resource Endowments
Between 1956  and  1976,  rice production per hectare in the study village
rose dramatically, from 2.5  to 6.7  metric  tons  per hectare per year.  This
was  due  to two  technical innovations.  In  1958,  the national irrigation
system was extended to  the village.  This permitted double-cropping to
replace single-cropping,  thereby substantially  increasing the  annual
production per hectare of  rice  land.  The second major technical change
was  the introduction in the  late 1960s  of  the modern high-yielding rice
varieties.  The diffusion of modern varieties was  accompanied by  increased
use  of fertilizer and pesticides and by  the adoption of  improved cultural
practices  such as straight-row planting and intensive weeding.
Population growth in  the village was  rapid.  Between 1966 and  1976  the
number of households  rose from 66  to  109  and the  population rose from 383
to 464, while cultivated area remained virtually constant.  The number of
landless laborer households increased from 20  to  54.  In  1976,  half of
the  households in the village had no land to  cultivate, not  even land for
rent.  The average  farm size declined  from 2.3  to 2.0  hectares.
The land is  farmed primarily  by  tenants.  In 1976,  only  1.7  hectares
of  the  108 hectares  of cropland in the village were owned by  village residents.
In  both 1956  and  1966,  70 percent  of  the  land was  farmed under share tenure
arrangements.  In 1963,  a new agricultural  land reform code was passed
which was designed to  break the  political power of  the  traditional landed
elite and to provide greater incentives  to peasant producers of  basic2-9
food crops.  A major feature of  the new legislation was an arrangement
that  permitted  tenants  to initiate a shift  from share  tenure to  leasehold,
with rent  under the  leasehold set  at  25  percent of  the average yield  for
the  previous three years.  Implementation of  the  code between  the mid-1960s
and the mid-1970s  resulted in a decline  in the  percentage of  land farmed
under  share  tenure  to  30  percent.
Institutional Innovation
The shift from share tenure  to  lease tenure was  not, however,  the
only change  in tenure relationships  that occurred between 1966  and 1976.
There was a sharp  increase in the  number of  plots farmed under subtenancy
arrangements.  The number increased from one  in 1956,  to  sixteen in  1976.
Subtenancy is  illegal under the  land  reform code.  The  subtenancy arrange-
ments  are usually made without the formal consent  of  the  landowner.  All
cases  of  subtenancy were on land  farmed under a leasehold arrangement.  The
most common subtenancy arrangement was fifty-fifty sharing of  costs  and
output.
The incentive  for  the emergence of  the subtenancy  institution was  that
the  rent  paid  to landlords  under the leasehold arrangement was below the
equilibrium rent--the level which would reflect both the higher yields of
rice obtained with the new technology and  the lower wage rates  implied by
the  increase  in population pressure against  the land.
To test  this hypothesis, market  prices were used  to compute the value
of  the unpaid factor inputs  (family labor and  capital) for  different  tenure
arrangements during  the 1976 wet season.  The results indicate that  the
share-to-land was  lowest and the operators' surplus was  the highest  for the
land under leasehold tenancy.  In contrast,  the share-to-land was  the
highest and no surplus was  left for  the operator who cultivated the  land2-10
under the subtenancy  arrangement (Table 1).  Indeed, the  share-to-land when
the land was  farmed under subtenancy was very close  to the  sum of  the
share-to-land plus  the operators'  surplus under the other tenure arrangement.
A substantial portion of  the economic rent was  captured by  the leasehold
tenants  in the form of operators'  surplus.  On  the  land farmed under a
subtenancy arrangement,  the rent was  shared between the  leaseholder and
the landlord.
A second institutional  change, induced by higher yields and the increase
in population pressure, has  been the  emergence of a new pattern of employer-
labor relationship between farm operators  and  landless workers.  According to
the traditional system called hunusan, laborers who participated  in the
harvesting  and threshing  received a one-sixth share of  the harvest.  By
1976, most  of  the farmers  (83 percent) adopted a system called gamma,  in
which participation  in the.harvesting operation was limited to workers who
had performed  the weeding operation without receiving wages.
The emergence of  the gamma  system can  be  interpreted as  an institutional
innovation designed  to reduce the wage rate  for harvesting to a level equal
to the marginal  productivity of  labor.  In the  1950s, when the  rice yield
per  hectare  was  low  and  labor  was  less  abundant,  the  one-sixth  share  may
have approximated an equilibrium wage level.  With the higher yields and
the more abundant supply  of  labor,  the one-sixth share became  larger than
the marginal product of  labor in the harvesting operation.
To test the hypothesis  that  the gamma system was adopted  rapidly
primarily because  it represented an  institutional innovation that  permitted
farm operators  to equate  the harvesters' shares of  output to  the marginal
productivity of  labor,  imputed wage costs were compared with the actual
harvesters' share  (Table 2).  The  results indicate that a substantial gap2-11
existed between the imputed wage  for  the harvesters'  labor alone and the
actual harvesters'  shares.  This  gap was  eliminated if  the imputed wages
for harvesting and weeding  labor were added.
Those results  are consistent with the hypothesis  that the  changes in
institutional arrangements  governing the use of  production factors were
induced when disequilibria between the marginal returns and  the marginal
costs  of  factor inputs occurred as a result  of  changes  in factor endowments
and  technical change.  Institutional change, therefore, was  directed toward
the establishment of  a new equilibrium in factor markets.
Efficiency  and Equity
It  is  important  to recognize  that  subtenancy,  and gamma contracts were
the institutional innovations  to  facilitate more efficient  resource allocations
through voluntary agreements by  assigning more  complete private  property
rights.  The land reform laws gave  tenants strong protection of  their
tenancy  rights with the  result that a part  of  land property rights,  which
is  the  right  to continue  tilling the soil at  a rent  lower than the marginal
product of  land, was  assigned to tenant  operators.  But  the laws prohibited
tenants from renting  their land  to someone else who might utilize it  more
efficiently, when they become  elderly or  found more profitable off-farm
employment,  for example.  Subtenancy was  developed to  reduce such inefficiency
due  to  the institutional rigidity in the land rental market based on the land
reform programs.  Likewise,  the gamma  system was developed  to  counteract
the institutional rigidity in the labor market  based on the  traditional
custom in the rural community in the form of  a fixed harvester's share.
It  might appear that  these institutional innovations increased efficiency
at  the expense of equity.  But,  if  the subtenancy system had not  been2-12
developed, the  route would have been closed for  some of  the  landless
laborers  to become farm operators  and use  their entrepreneurial abilities
more profitably.  If  the implicit wage  rate for harvesting work had been
raised in the absence of  the gamma  contract,  it  might have encouraged
mechanization in threshing and thereby reduced employment and labor earnings.
It  must be  recognized  that  the  institutional innovations  that  resulted  in
more efficient markets as  a result  of  the assignment of  more complete  private
property rights  do not necessarily impair equity, as  is  often argued by
Marxist  and  populist  critiques  of  private  market  institutions.
In  the case reviewed here  the  induced  innovation process  leading  toward
the establishment of  equilibrium in land and  labor markets  occurred very
rapdily  in spite of  the  fact  that  many of  the  transactions--between  landlords,
tenants, and  laborers--were less  than fully monetized.  Informal contractual
arrangements  or agreements were utilized.  The  subleasing and the gamma
labor contract evolved without  the mobilization  of  substantial political
activity or  bureaucratic effort.  Indeed,  the subleasing arrangement evolved
in spite of  legal prohibition!  Where  substantial political and bureaucratic
resources must  be mobilized  to  bring about  technical or  institutional change,
the changes  occur much more slowly,  as  in the  cases  of  the English enclosure
movements and the Thai and Japanese property rights cases  referred to at
the  beginning  of  this  section.
The Philippine village  study reviewed in  this section was specifically
designed to  facilitate the  analysis  of  the interrelationships between
changes in resource endowments, technical change and institutional  change.
It would be extremely valuable to  have additional studies specifically
designed for  this purpose.  It would, for example, be  particularly useful2-13
to  examine  the interrelationships  among  the  expansion  of  gravity  irrigation
systems, the  public programs  to  reduce water  logging  and salinity, the
development of private  tubewells,  the introduction  of high-yielding  varieties
of wheat and  rice,  the mechnization of  land preparation and harvesting, and
the rapid growth of  rural population for  changes  in market and nonmarket
institutions  in  the  Pakistan  Punjab.
DEMAND FOR INSTITUTIONAL  INNOVATION:  NONMARKET INSTITUTIONS
The examples  of  institutional change advanced in the  previous section,
such as  the Enclosure in England and  the evolution of  private property
rights  in  land in Japan and Thailand, have  contributed to  the development
of  a more efficient  market  system.  Institutional changes  of  this  type are
profitable for  society only if  the  costs  involved in  the assignment and
protection of  rights  are  smaller than  the gains from better resource
allocation.  If  those  costs  are very high,  it  may  be  necessary to design
nonmarket institutions  in order  to achieve more efficient resource
allocation.
For example, in Japan, although the system of private property rights
was  developed on cropland during the  pre-modern period, communal ownership
at  the village level permitted open access  to large areas  of wild and  forest
land which were utilized for  the collection of  firewood,  leaves,  and wild
grasses  to  fertilize rice  fields.  However, over time more detailed  common
property rules were stipulated for  the  use of  communal land  in order  to
prevent  resource exhaustion.
Detailed stipulations  of  the  time and  place of  utilization of  communal
land  as well as rules  for mobilizing village  labor to maintain communal
property (such as  applying fire  to  regenerate pasture) were often enforced2-14
with religious  taboos  and  rituals.  Those communal village institutions
remained viable because  it was much more costly to demarcate and  partition
wild and forest  land  than cropland among individuals and to enforce exclusive
use.  Any villager's use of  communal land involves externality.  For example,
his collection of  firewood reduced the availability of  the  firewood for
other villagers.  If property  rights are  not  assigned, there may be  only
limited incentive  for resource  conservation.  This  is  not a serious problem
if  the resource  that  is  subject  to  open access  is  abundant  relative to
population.  However, as population pressure begins  to  rise, a common
understanding regarding appropriate use,  reinforced by  social sanctions,
may act  to limit excessive exploitation.  But,  as  population growth continues
to press against limited land  resources  and  the market value of  the resource
product  rises,  it  becomes necessary to  impose more formal  regulations
regarding the access of  individual villagers to  communal land.
Group  action to supply public goods,  such as  the maintenance of  communal
land, may work effectively  if  the size of  the group involved is  small, as  in  the
case of  a village  community.  However, if  a large number of  people are involved
in the use of  a public good, as  in the case  of  marine fisheries, it  is  more
difficult  to regulate  their resource use or  to prevent free  riders  by means
of  voluntary  agreements.  Action by a higher authority with coercive power,
such as government, may be  required to  limit  free  riding.
The 'socialization' of  agricultural research  is  common not  only in
socialist economies  but also in market economies.  This  can be  explained
by  the failure  of  the market in allocating resources  efficiently for the
supply of public goods  for a large, unidentifiable clientele group.  New
information or knowledge resulting from research is  typically endowed with
the attributes of  a public good characterized by nonrivalness  or jointness2-15
in supply and utilization, and  nonexcludability or  external economies.
The first attribute implies  that  the good  is  equally available  to all.
The second implies  that  it  is  impossible  for private producers  to appropriate
through market pricing the  full social  benefits  arising directly from the
production (and consumption) of  the good--it  is  difficult to exclude  from
the utilization of  the good those who do not  pay for it.  A socially optimal
level of  supply of  such a good cannot  be expected  if  its  supply is  left to
private firms.  However, present  institutional arrangements  are such  that
much information resulting from basic research is nonexcludable.  This is
the major reason why it  has  been necessary to  estalish nonprofit  institutions
to advance basic  scientific knowledge.
A unique  aspect of  agricultural  research, particularly  that  directed
to advancing biological technology, is  that  many of  the products of
research--even in the  applied area--are  characterized by nonexcludability.
Protection by  patent  laws  is  either unavailable or  inadequate.  The nature
of  agricultural production to  be  conducted would make it  difficult to
restrict information about new technology or practices.  Furthermore, even
the largest  farms  are  relatively small units and would not  be able  to
capture  more than a small share of  the gains  from inventive activity.
Private  research activities in agriculture have been directed primarily
toward developing mechanical  technology for which patent  protection is
established.
Another important  attribute of  the research production function is  that
it  has  a stochastic form.  Research, by  nature, is  characterized by  risk
and uncertainty.  Success  in a research project is  like hitting a  'successful
oil well.'  Any number of dry  holes may be  bored before the successful one
is  found.  Richard Nelson has  pointed out  that this  stochastic nature  of2-16
the  research production function, which is  especially strong in the case of
basic research,  contributes  to the  failure of  the market in attaining
optimum resource allocation over  time:
'The very large variance of  the profit probability distribution
from a basic research project will tend  to cause a risk-avoiding
firm, without  the economic resources  to spread the risk  by running
a number of basic-research projects at  once,  to value a basic-research
project at significantly  less  than its  expected profitability  and
hence,  ...  at  less  than its  social value.'
The public-good attributes of  the agricultural  research product  together
with the stochastic nature of  the research production function make public
support  of agricultural  research socially desirable.  It  does not  necessarily
follow, however, that  agricultural research should be  conducted in govern-
mental institutions  financed by  tax revenue.  If  the benefit consists
primarily of producers'  surplus, agricultural research may be  left  to  the
cooperative activities  of  agricultural producers  (i.e.,  to  the activities
of  such institutions as  agricultural  commodity  organizations and cooperatives).
In the United States organized producers are funding an increasing share of
agricultural research by  means of  a tax or  a cess on production.
The willingness  of  organized producers  to share the  costs of  research
appears  to  be related  to the elasticity of  demand in domestic and international
markets  for  the specific commodity.  Research on a number of tropical
export crops grown under plantation conditions such as  sugar, bananas,
and  rubber is  also often supported in this manner.  The emergence of  new
institutional arrangements such as plant  variety registration, which provides
patent  like protection for new crop varieties, also acts  to  shift the2-17
optimum allocation of  agricultural  research resources  in favor of  the private
sector.
However,  most agricultural commodities  are produced  by a number of
small producers.  Under these conditions  voluntary cooperation to support
research would be very costly to organize.  Furthermore, most agricultural
commodities, except  those intended for  export,  are characterized by  low
price elasticity of  demand.  As a result,  a major share of  the social
benefit  produced by  research tends  to  be  transmitted  to consumers  through
lower market prices.  In  such a situation the  cost of  agricultural  research
should be  borne by  the general public.
If  agricultural research were left entirely to  the private  sector the
result would be serious  bias in  the allocation of  research resources.
Resources would flow primarily to  those areas of  mechanical and chemical
technology that  are  adequately protected by patents  and to those areas of
biological  technology where the  results  can be  protected by  trade secrets
(such as  the inbred  lines used in the  production of  hybrid corn seed).
Other areas,  such as  research on open pollinated seed varieties, biological
control of  insects and pathogens, and improvements  in farming practices
and management, would be neglected.  The socialization of  agricultural
research or  the predominance  of  public institutions  in agricultural research,
especially in the biological sciences,  can  be considered a major institu-
tional innovation designed  to offset what would otherwise represent a
serious distortion in the allocation of  research resources.
THE SUPPLY OF INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION
We have identified the disequilibria in economic relationships  asso-
ciated with economic growth, such  as  technical change leading to  the genera-2-18
tion  of  new  income  streams  and  changes  in  relative factor endowments, as
important sources  of  demand for  institutional change.  But  the sources  of
supply of institutional innovation are  less well understood.  The factors
that  reduce the  cost  of  institutional innovation have not  been widely
studied by economists or  by  other social scientists.
In the Philippines village  case changes  in tenure and labor market
institutions were supplied, in  response  to  the changes  in demand generated
by changing factor endowments and new income streams, through  the individual
and joint decisions  of  owner-cultivators,  tenants and laborers.  But even
at this  level it  was necessary  for gains  to  the innovators to be  large
enough to offset the  risk of  ignoring the  land reform prohibitions  against
subleasing and the social costs  involved in changing  traditional harvest-
sharing arrangements.  While mobilization of  substantial political resources
was  not  required to  introduce and extend the  new land and labor market
institutions,  the distribution of  political resources within the  village
did influence  the initiation and diffusion of  the institutional innovations.
The supply of  major institutional innovations, however, necessarily
involves the mobilization of  substantial political resources.  It  is  useful
to think in  terms of  a supply  schedule of institutional  innovation that  is
determined by the marginal cost schedule facing political entrepreneurs  as
they attempt  to design new institutions and resolve the conflicts among
various  interest groups  (or suppression of  opposition when necessary).
This  implies that  institutional innovations will be  supplied if  the expected
return from the innovation that accrues  to the politician entrepreneurs
exceeds  the marginal cost  of mobilizing the  resources  necessary to introduce
the innovation.  To the  extent that  the private  return to  the political2-19
entrepreneurs  is  different  from the social  return, the  institutional
innovation will not  be  supplied at  a socially optimum level.
The supply of  institutional  innovation depends  critically  on the
power  structure or balance among interest groups  in a society.  If
the power balance is  such that the political entrepreneurs' efforts to
introduce an institutional innovation with a high rate of  social return
are  adequately rewarded by  greater prestige and stronger political support,
a socially desirable  institutional innovation may occur.  However, if  the
institutional innovation is  expected to  result in a loss  to a dominant
political block, the  innovation may not  be forthcoming even if  it  is  expected
to produce a large net gain to  society as  a whole.  And socially undesirable
institutional innovations  may occur if  the  returns  to  the entrepreneur or
the  interest group  exceed the gains  to  society.
The failure of many developing countries  to  institutionalize the
agricultural  research capacity needed to  take advantage of  the  large gains
from relatively modest investments  in technical change may  be due,  in part,
to the divergence between social returns  and the private returns  to  political
entrepreneurs.  In  the mid-1920s,  for  example, agricultural development in
Argentina appeared to be  proceeding along a path roughly comparable to that
of  the United States.  Mechanization of  crop production lagged slightly
behind that  in the United States.  Grain yields per hectare averaged slightly
higher than in the United States.  In contrast to the United States, however,
output and yields in Argentina remained relatively stagnant between  the
mid-1920s and the mid-1970s.  It was not until the  late 1970s  that
Argentina began to realize significant gains  in agricultural productivity.
Part of  this lag  in Argentine agricultural development was  due to  the
disruption of  export markets in the  1930s  and  194 0s.  Students of Argentine2-20
development  have pointed  to  the political dominance  of  the landed aristocracy,
to  the rising tensions  between urban and  rural interests,  and  to inappropriate
domestic policies  toward agriculture.  The Argentine case would seem to
represent a situation where the bias  in  the distribution of  political
and economic resources  imposed exceptionally costly  delays in the  institutional
innovations needed to  take advantage of  the relatively inexpensive sources
of  growth that  technical  change in agriculture could have made available.
Cultural endowments, including  religion and ideology, exert  a strong
influence on the supply of  institutional innovation.  They make  some forms
of  institutional change less  costly to establish and impose severe costs  on
others.  For example, the  traditional moral obligation  in  the Japanese village
community  to cooperate  in joint  communal infrastructure maintenance  has made
it  less  costly  to implement  rural development programs  than in  societies where
such.traditions do  not prevail.  These activities had  their origin in  the
feudal organization of  rural communities  in the  pre-Meiji period.  But
practices such as maintenance  of village and agricultural roads and of
irrigation and drainage ditches through joint activities in which all
families contribute  labor were still practiced in well over half  of  the
hamlets  in Japan as  recently as  1970.
Japanese scholars who are concerned about  the modernization of
social institutions  tend  to emphasize the  decline in the practices of
such traditional forms  of  cooperation--they emphasize  that the  traditional
forms  of  cooperation are practiced in  only about half  of  the  rural hamlets
in Japan.  Scholars who are concerned about the  continuity of  traditional
cultural values stress the  continued viability  of  traditional institutions.
They point  out that only about half  of  the hamlets still practice traditional
forms of  cooperation.  In my view such traditional patterns of  cooperation2-21
have represented an important  cultural resource  on which  to erect modern
forms  of  cooperative marketing and joint  farming activities.  Similar
cultural resources  are  not  available in  South Asian villages where, for
example, the cast  structure inhibits  cooperation and encourages occupational
specialization.
Likewise, the aspirations associated with the adoption of  new ideological
commitments  may reduce  the  cost to political entrepreneurs  of mobilizing
collective action for  institutional change.  For example, in  the United
States  the Jeffersonian concept  of  agrarian democracy provided ideological
support  for  the  series  of  land ordinances  culminating in the Homestead Act
of  1862,  which established  the  legal framework designed to encourage  an
owner-operator system of  agriculture  in  the American West.  Strong
nationalist sentiment  in Meiji Japan, reflected in slogans such as  'A
Wealthy Nation and Strong Army' (Fukoku Kyohei),  helped mobilize  the
resources  needed for  the  establishment of  vocational schools and agricultural
and industrial experiment stations.  In China,  communist  ideology,
reinforced by  the lessons learned during the guerrilla period in Yenan,
inspired the mobilization of  communal resources  to  build irrigation systems
and other forms  of  physical infrastructure and  social overhead  capital.
Thus,  ideology can  be a critical resource for  political entrepreneurs
and an important  factor affecting the  supply of  institutional innovations.
Advances in social  sciences that  improve knowledge relevant  to  the
design of  institutional  innovations  that  are  capable of  generating new
income  streams  or  that  reduce the  cost  of  conflict  resolution also act  to
shift  the supply of  institutional change to  the  right.  Throughout history,
improvements  in institutional performance have occurred primarily  through
the  slow accumulation  of  successful precedent or  as  by-products  of expertise2-22
and experience.  Institutional  change was generated through the process of
trial and error much in the same manner that technical change was generated
prior to  the invention of  the research university,  the agricultural
experiment station, or  the industrial research laboratory.  With the
institutionalization  of  research in the  social sciences and related
professions  the process of  institutional  innovation has begun to proceed
much more efficiently.  It  is  becoming increasingly possible to substitute
social science knowledge and analytical skill for  the more expensive
process  of  learning  by  trial  and  error.
If  this view is  correct  it  suggests  that a major source of  demand for
social science knowledge is  derived from the demand for  institutional
innovation.  But  how responsive is  the  supply of  social science knowledge
to the demand for  institutional change arising  out of  social conflict  or
economic growth.  Is  the supply of  social science knowledge sufficiently
elastic to  reduce the  cost  of  institutional change?  Or  is society  typically
forced with a situation where  the demand for institutional innovation shifts
against a relatively  inelastic supply  curve?  The most pervasive view among
historians  or economic thought  is  that  the supply of  social science knowledge
is  relatively  inelastic.
My own view is  somewhat more optimistic.  In the  field of  development
the  research that led  to  advances in our understanding of  the production
and consumption behavior of  rural households in less  developed countries
represents an important  example of  the contribution of advances  in social
science knowledge to  the  design of more efficient institutions.  In a number
of  countries this research has  led  to the  abandonment  of policies that  viewed
peasant households  as  unresponsive to economic incentives.  And it has
led to  the design of  policies and institutions to  make more productive2-23
technologies available to  peasant producers  and  to  the design of  more
efficient  price policies  for  factors  and products.  Similarly, the
diffusion  of  education designed to  raise  the intellectual  level of  the
general public and  to facilitate better understanding of  the private and
social costs  of  institutional change may reduce  the cost  to political
entrepreneurs  of  introducing socially desirable  institutions and  raise the
cost  of  biasing institutional change  in a manner that  is  costly to  society.
How might we test  this view that  the demand for institutional change,
or improvements  in institutional performance,  is a primary source  of demand
for social science knowledge?  One method  is  to draw on comparative inter-
national experience.  Which societies  tend  to draw most extensively  on  social
science knowledge and which societies  draw least  on social science knowledge
in policy design and reform?  It seems  clear  that  societies in which the
design of  social institutions  is strongly  determined by  ideology or religion
exhibit a very weak demand for  social science knowledge.  The USSR, for
example, tends  to  draw primarily on that  narrow range of  economics  most
closely related to engineering - input/output  analysis,  mathematical
programming, and  sector modeling.  In China much of  the capacity in economics
is  devoted to  rationalizing  the implications  of  shifts  in economic ideology.
Relatively  little capacity  is  devoted  to institutional design.
It  also seems clear  that  the demand for  social science knowledge is
strongest  in those societies  and in  those historical periods  in which the
burdens  of  ideology,  religion and tradition impose relatively weak constraints
on institutional design.  And within any society it  seems apparent  that
the  demand for social  science knowledge  is  strongest when that society
is  attempting to confront  the problems  of  the  present  rather than when it2-24
is  attempting to  recapture  romantic memories  of  the past or  pursuing utopian
visions  of  the  future.
TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE MODEL OF  INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
This review of  the state  of  our knowledge with respect  to  the  forces  and
processes of  institutional innovation leaves  one with two general perspec-
tives.  The  first is  that  it  is  possible  to use the  tools  of  modern analytical
economics  to advance our understanding of  the process of  institutional
change.  The second is  that  the state of  our knowledge remains highly
unsatisfactory.  But how do we  continue the tentative  advances that  have
been made?  Instead of  attempting to provide a direct  response to  this
question let  me map out where we have been and where I think we  are in
this  quest.
I illustrate, in Figure 1, the elements of  a'model that maps  the
general equilibrium relationships among  resource endowments, cultural
endowments, technologies  and institutions.  The model goes  beyond the
conventional general equilibrium model in which resource endowments,
technologies, institutions,  and  culture (conventionally designated as  tastes)
are  taken as given and are ignored in the analysis.
In the study of  long-term social and economic change  the relationships
among the  several variables must  be  treated  as  recursive.  The formal
microeconomic models that  are employed to  analyze the  supply and demand for
technical and institutional change  can be  thought  of  as  'nested' within
the  general equilibrium framework of  Figure 1.
One advantage of  the  'pattern model' outlined in Figure 1 is  that it
helps  to identify areas of  ignorance.  Our  capacity to model and test  the
relationships between resource endowments and  technical change is  relatively2-25
strong.  Our  capacity to model and test  the relationships  between cultural
endowments and either technical or  institutional  change is  relatively weak.
A  second advantage of  the model is  that  it  is  useful in identifying  the
model components  that enter into other attempts  to account  for secular
economic and social change.
For example, historians working within the Marxist tradition often tend
to view technical  change as dominating both institutional and cultural change.
In his  book, Oriental Despotism, Karl Wittfogel views  the irrigation technology
used in wet rice  cultivation in East Asia as  determining political organization.
In terms  of  Figure 1 his primary  emphasis was  on the  impact of  resource
endowments on institutions  (C) and (B).
A serious misunderstanding  can be  observed in contemporary neo-Marxian
critiques of  the  'green revolution.'  These criticisms have focused
attention almost entirely on the  impact of  technical  change on labor and
land tenure relations.  Both the  radical and populist  critics  have emphasized
relation  (B).  But  they have  tended to  ignore relationships  (A)  and  (C).
Why have scholars working within the Marxian or other radical political
economy  traditions  tended to  attribute changes  in  property rights  and
income  distribution to technical  change which, in  a more comprehensive
analysis,  appear to  reflect the impact  of changes  in resource endowments -
particularly  the changes  in man-land ratios  associated with demographic
change?  A partial answer to  this  question must  be  sought in  the rather
simple model that  is  conventionally employed in Marxian analysis  (Figure 2).
In  the Marxian model  the resource endowment and technology categories  of
Figure 1 are subsumed under the rubric of  "forces of  production."  It  is  not
stretching  conventional usage too much to associate  "relations of  production"
and  "superstructure" in Figure 2 with "institutions" and "cultural endowments"2-26
in Figure 1.  There is  a long history  of  debate over whether Marx was  a
technological determinest  as  reflected in  (M)  and  (m) in Figure 2.  It  is
quite clear  that Lenin's  view of  the  relationship between  the superstructure,
the relations of  production and the  forces  of  production gave  substantial
weight to relations  (L) and  (1).
It  does seem clear that many  of  the critics  of  the green revolution
have conducted  their analysis encumbered by  ideological blinders.  This
blindness traces  back  to the  debates between Malthus and Marx.  The  result
has been repeated failure to  effectively identify the separate effects
of population growth and  technical change on the growth and distribution  of
income.  The analytical power of  the more  complete induced innovation model
was  illustrated in the work by Hayami and Kikuchi, discussed earlier  in
this  paper, on the  impact of  both  technical change and population growth on
changes in land tenure and labor market relationships in the Philippines;
American scholars such  as Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, working
within what has  come  to be  called the  "property rights"  paradigm, identify
a  primary  function  of  property  rights  as  guiding  incentives  to  achieve
greater internalization of  externalities.  They consider that  the clear
specification of  property rights  reduces  transaction costs  in the  face of
growing competition  for the use  of  scarce  resources as  a result of
population growth and/or growth in product demand.
Douglass North and John Paul Thomas, building on the Alchian-Demsetz
paradigm, have attempted to  explain the  economic growth of Western Europe
between 900  and 1700 primarily  in terms  of  changes  in property institutions.
During the eleventh and thirteenth centuries  the pressure of population against
increasingly  scarce land resources  induced innovations  in property  rights
that  in turn created profitable opportunities  for  the generation and adoption2-27
of  labor-intensive technical  changes  in agriculture.  The population decline
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries  was viewed as  a primary factor
leading  to  the demise of  feudalism and  the rise  of  the national state (line C).
These institutional  changes  in turn opened up new possibilities  for economies
of  scale in nonagricultural production and  in trade  (line b).
In a more recent work Mancur Olson has  emphasized the proliferation of
institutions  as a source  of economic decline.  He  also regards broad-based
encompassing organizations  as having incentives  to generate growth and
redistribute  incomes  to  their members with little excess  burden.  For
example, a broadly based  coalition that encompasses  the majority of  agri-
cultural producers  is  more  likely to  exert  political pressure  for growth-
oriented policies  that  will enable its  members to  obtain a larger share of
a larger national product  than a smaller organization  that represents  the
interests  of  the producers  of  a single commodity.  Small organizations
representing  narrow interest groups  are more likely  to pursue the interests
of  their members at  the expense of  the welfare of  other producers  and  the
general public.  In  contrast, an even more broadly based farmer-labor
coalition would be  more concerned with promoting economic growth than an
organization representing a single sector.  But  large groups, in Olson's
view, are inherently unstable  because rational individuals will not  incur
the costs  of  contributing to  the  realization of  the  large group program--
they have strong incentives  to act  as  "free riders."  As a result, organiza-
tional  'space' in a stable society will be  increasingly occupied by  special
interest  'distributional coalitions.'  These distributional coalitions
make political life more devisive.  They  slow down the adoption of  new
technologies  (line b) and limit  the capacity to  reallocate resources2-28
(line c).  The effect  is  to slow down economic growth or in some cases
initiate  a  period  of  economic  decline.
What are  the implications  of  the theory of  institutional  innovation
outlined in this  paper for  the research agenda on the economics of
institutional change?  In our research on the direction and rate of
technical change we were able  to advance significantly our knowledge by
treating technical  change as  endogenous--as induced primarily by  changes
in relative resource endowments  and the growth of  demand.  We have  also
attempted to develop a theory of  induced institutional innovation in which
we treat  institutional  innovation as  endogenous.  There is  now a significant
body  of evidence that suggests  that  substantial new  insights on institutional
innovation and diffusion can be obtained by  treating institutional change
as  an economic response to  changes  in resource endowments and  technical
change.
We also insist  on the potential significance of  cultural endowments,
including the factors  that  economists  typically  conceal under  the rubric of
tastes and that  political scientists include under ideology.  But our
capacity to develop rigorous empirical  tests capable of  identifying the
relative significance of  the  relationships between cultural endowments and
the other elements  of  the model outlined in Figure 1 is nowhere  near as
satisfactory as  the econometric tests analysis  that has  been used to test
the induced technical  change hypothesis discussed in my  first lecture.
SUntil our colleagues  in the  other social sciences provide us with more
helpful analytical tools,  we are  forced to  adhere to  a strategy that focuses
primarily on the interactions  between resource endowments, technical  change,
and institutional change.  The strategy suggested here does  not have the2-29
clear advantage of  allowing us  to explore how far  a strategy based on the
rather  straightforward extension of  standard microeconomic theory will take
us  in the analysis  of  both  technical and institutional change.2-30
a
SEndowmentsI i--------  ^
Figure  1.0 Interrelationships between changes in resource
endowments, cultural endowments, technology,
and institutions.
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Figure 2.0  The Marxian Model
Forces  of  Production
[machines,  materials
labor, technology]
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Table  2.0 Comparison between the imputed value  of harvesters' share







No. of working days of
Gamma  labor  (days/ha)
Weeding
Harvesting/threshing





Actual  share  of  harvesters:
In  kind  (kg/ha)c















(2)  - (1)  -32.8  33.0
Includes labor of family members who worked as Gamma laborers.
b Imputation using market wage rates  (daily wage =  P8.0 for weeding,
P11.0  for  harvesting).
SOne-sixth  of  output  per  hectare.
Imputation using market prices  (1  kg =  Pl).
Source:  Yujiro Hayami and Masao Kikuchi, Asian Village Economy at  the
Crossroads:  An Economic Approach  to  Institutional Change  (Tokyo:
University of Tokyo Press,  1981,  and Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota  Press,  1982),  p. 121.
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